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NPS_Watch Jun 03, 2019
#1
The Daily Dose - Exposing the nuclear power industry while the nuclear power industry exposes you.

There is 9 EN(s) today, 4 associated with power stations.

[ ]

NRC Event Notices for June 03, 2019 |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...603en.html

[  ]

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----------------- Power Reactor Event Notices
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----------- [ Current event for TX_SouthTx_1 ]

20190601 | TX_SouthTx_1 | OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO GASOLINE LEAKAGE TO SITE DRAINAGE SYSTEM |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en54097

"On June 1,2019, at 1618 [CDT], a notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) is being made due to notification to offsite agencies as a result of gasoline leakage to the site drainage system in the owner controlled area at South Texas Project.
[ Where does the drainage system drain to? ]

"During a routine tour, the facilities department notified the site environmental group about a gasoline leak on fuel tank sight glass at the fuel island on site.

The site environmental [group] has determined the leak amount requires notification
to the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency National Response Center.

"The Texas Commission of Environmental Quality was notified at 1618 on June 1, 2019,
and the Environmental Protection Agency National Response Center at 1626 on June 1, 2019.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee stated that approximately 1,384 gallons of gasoline leaked over a period of time.
The spill is located at an equipment warehouse area at a distance from the plant.
The leak has been isolated and the cleanup is expected to be completed by tomorrow.


----------- [ 2019 event history for TX_SouthTx ]

20190423 | TX_SouthTX_1;2 | FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - ALGORITHM USED FOR RANDOM TESTING EXCLUDED A POPULATION OF INDIVIDUALS |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en54024

20190306 | TX_SouthTX_1;2 | PART 21 REPORT - TARGET ROCK SOLENOID VALVE 810000-X POSITIONER CIRCUIT FAILURE MAY CAUSE UNDESIRED POSITION |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53912


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----------- [ Current event for LA_RiverBend_1 ]

20190601 | LA_RiverBend_1 | MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en54096

"At 2345 CDT at River Bend Station (RBS) Unit 1,
a manual Reactor scram was inserted in anticipation of receiving an automatic Reactor Water Level 3 (9.7") scram
due to the isolation of the 'B' Heater String with the 'A' Heater String already isolated.

The 'B' heater string isolation caused loss of suction and subsequent trip of the running Feed Water Pumps 'A' and 'C'.

All control rods fully inserted with no issues.

Subsequently Reactor level was controlled by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system.

Feed Water Pump 'C' was restored 4 minutes after the initial trip and the RCIC system secured.

Currently RBS-1 is stable and is being cooled down using Turbine Bypass Valves.

"No radiological releases have occurred due to this event from the unit."

The plant is currently under a normal shutdown electrical lineup.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


----------- [ 2019 event history for LA_RiverBend ]

20190514 | LA_RiverBend_1 | restart
20190513 | LA_RiverBend_1 | shutdown

20190511 | LA_RiverBend_1 | Exit RFO ( 42 / 34 )

20190426 | LA_RiverBend_1 | THROUGH WALL LEAK ON STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM PIPING |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en54031 |
RFOD_028; RX Mode: Refueling; Refueling

20190330 | LA_RiverBend_1 | Begin RFO ( 01 / 34 )


[ no previous ENs for this site in 2019 ]

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----------- [ Current event for
----------- [ 2019 event history for
[ no previous ENs for this site in 2019 ]
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------------[ PART 21 ] - These ENs are for issues that involve multiple site/reactor units
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20190531 | PART21 | PART 21 NOTIFICATION - INTROL POSITIONERS POTENTIAL LATENT DEFECT |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en54095

The following is an excerpt of the part 21 information received via email:

"Introl Positioners used by stations in G32 Terry Turbine control applicators have the potential to contain a latent defect.

The defect is the result of internal corrosion which has been identified in Tl Operational Amplifiers Part No.TL084CN
on the SL3EX Controller Boards of the turbine throttle valve positioner.

It is believed the likely cause is associated with the ingress of solder flux into the IC Chip package on the controller board
due to delamination caused by the soldering process during fabrication.

The corrosion over time can result in intermittent open circuiting and high resistance in the aluminum metallization.

Chlorine ionic contamination can also result in high leakage currents within the component circuitry.

Failures may be manifested by a reduced valve position signal disproportional to the expected demand condition,
no actuation signal (i.e. throttle valve remaining full open), or other anomalous unexpected behavior.

There are three TL084CN chips on each SL3EX Controller Board within the positioner assembly.

There have been two documented failures to date occurring in 2015 and 2019 in installed systems.

"Date determination was made: May 29, 2019

"Affected sites:
Farley, SONGS, Cooper, Almaraz Trillo Nuclear Power Plant (Spain), Clinton, Harris, Wolf Creek, Point Beach, Hatch, Watts Bar, Sequoyah.

"Stations are advised to work directly with Curtiss-Wright SAS via the technical contacts below.

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20190531 | PART21 | Update PART 21 NOTIFICATION - NAMCO LIMIT SWITCH FAILED TEST DUE TO INSUFFICIENT LUBRICATION |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53653

The following information was received via email from Curtiss Wright:

"Curtiss-Wright was notified on August 7, 2018 by Exelon's Dresden Plant that a Curtiss-Wright Supplied Namco Limit Switch, P/N: EA700-90964 had failed during a planned maintenance test.

"The switch contacts were found to be sluggish in returning to the normal shelf state after actuation, or would not return at all. The switch was identified as Curtiss-Wright Tag Number 5T34603 and was provided as a safety related component to Exelon in September 2005. According to Exelon, the item was stored for 8 years, then failure occurred approximately 5 years into service. The part has a manufacturer date coded as August 2005.

"The switch was subsequently sent to Exelon Powerlabs where a detailed failure evaluation was performed. Exelon Powerlabs confirmed the failure mode and determined that there was insufficient lubrication in place to support normal switch function. The switch was then sent to Namco for further evaluation and Namco confirmed the lack of lubricant was the likely cause of the failure.

"Curtiss-Wright is currently investigating this issue and will provide a follow up report by November 15, 2018."


* * * UPDATE FROM TIM FRANCHUK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1335 EST ON 11/16/2018 * * *

The following information was received via E-mail:

"In reference to the Curtiss-Wright Interim Notification Report dated 10/8/2018 for an EA700-90964 limit switch failure, the following clarifications and updates are provided.

"The subject switch was originally supplied by Curtiss-Wright to Exelon's Dresden plant. Subsequently Dresden transferred the switch to Quad Cities where it was installed and found degraded and inoperable during a planned maintenance test. The initial notification of failure to Curtiss-Wright was by Quad Cities personnel, and not Dresden personnel. The switch was previously identified as Curtiss-Wright Tag Number 5T34603, which was incorrect. The actual Tag Number of the failed unit is 5T36403.

"The failure is still under investigation and Curtiss-Wright has been in communication with the manufacturer, Quad Cities personnel and Exelon Powerlabs personnel concerning the failure and application. A key factor in the failure appears to be heat related, specifically the switches operating temperature. As such, additional operating temperature data is being taken by Exelon personnel which will conclude in late February or early March 2019. Once this data is made available, a final conclusion as to the root cause of the failure can be determined.

"We therefore request additional time to complete our evaluation and should have our final report issued by March 8th, 2019."

Notified R3DO (Peterson) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors E-mail group.


* * * UPDATE ON 3/8/2019 AT 1320 EST FROM MARGIE HOOVER TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

The following information was received via email:

"In reference to the Curtiss-Wright Interim Notification Report dated 10/8/2018 for an EA700-90964 limit switch failure, the following updates are provided.

"Curtiss-Wright's investigation is ongoing, with the current focus being the evaluation of in-service switch operating temperatures and results from a recent disassembly/inspection of similar switches (same model but different date codes). Additional inspection of other switches currently in-service at the plant is needed to finish the investigation. Evaluation of these switches is expected to be completed by mid-May. Once this data is made available, a final conclusion as to the root cause of the failure can be determined.

"We therefore request additional time to complete our evaluation and should have our final report issued by May 31, 2019."

Notified R3DO (Hills) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors group (email).



* * * UPDATE AT 1106 EDT ON 5/31/19 FROM MARGIE HOVER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following information was received via e-mail:

"ln reference to the Curtiss-Wright Interim Notification Report dated 10/8/2018 (Event No. ML18289A457lLoC No. 2018-24-00) for an EA700-90954 limit switch failure, the following updates are provided.

"Curtiss-Wright was notified on August 7th, 2018 by Exelon's Quad Cities Plant that a Curtiss-Wright Supplied Namco Limit Switch, PIN: EA 700-90954 had failed during a planned maintenance test.


"CW Conclusion:

"Based upon similar wear patterns, the presence of 'significant grease' does not resolve wear pattern issue caused in a shorter period of time, thus the lack of grease can be considered to 'not be a significant credible failure mechanism' (same or no grease between shuttle and housing). Based upon the NAMCO report, the presence or lack of grease has no impact on wear or operability and thus does not affect the safety function.

"In addition, the CQ14100801 S/N 03 installed for 9 months, the O-Ring measured an 81 durometer hardness (showing aging) but not brittle. The other 3 installed for 6 years were brittle but did not affect operability. Thus the hardness of the O-Rings can be considered to 'not be a significant credible failure mechanism'.

"All four switches in Report QDC-62770 had paint scrapings caused by wear which was present and operated properly after being in service for an extended period of time. Thus the presence of paint residue due to wear can be considered to 'not be a significant credible failure mechanism'.

"There have been no other reported failures of this type. The root cause failure mechanism has not been identified, thus this switch failure does not appear to represent a common mode failure."

Notified the R3DO (Daley) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors group (via email).


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------------Other reactor info from daily power tracking https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...atus/2019/
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[  ]

Region 1
 
NJ_Hope_Creek_1 @ 100 % unch from 100 % Sunday; 81 % Saturday
[ no EN, unk reason for powr drop. ]

PA_Limerick_1 @ 100 % up from 80 % Sunday; 60 % Saturday
[ no EN, unk reason for power drop. ]

PA_Peach_Bottom_2 @ 100 % unch from 100 % Sunday; 55 % Saturday
[ no EN, unk reason for powr drop. ]

MA_Pilgrim_1 @ 0 % - PERMANENT SHUTDOWN

NJ_Salem_1 @ 0 % [ RPV OPEN ( 52 / 28 ) ] RFO started early

PA_Susquehanna_1 @ 91 % down from 100 % Sunday; 77 % Saturday
[ no EN, unk reason for power drop. ]


Region 2

AL_Browns_Ferry_2 @ 94 % unch from 94 % Sunday; 94 % Saturday
[ Completed RFO ( 39 / 25 ) ] power uprate testing, missed planned restart date

NC_Brunswick_2 @ 100 % unch from 100 % Sunday; 90 % Saturday
[ no EN, unk reason for power drop. ]

FL_Saint_Lucie_1 @ 0 % since 20190425
 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP |
 https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en54027

GA_Vogtle_1 @ 82 % up from 37 % Sunday; 100 % Saturday
[ no EN, unk reason for power drop. ]


Region 3 [ notice how many units dropped power Sunday ]

IL_Braidwood_1 @ 100 % up from 95 % Sunday; 100 % Saturday
[ no EN, unk reason for power drop. ]

IL_Clinton_1 @ 98 % unch from 98 % Sunday; 98 % Saturday
[ 98-99 % are this units normal thermal power range. ]

OH_Davis-Besse_1 @ 100 % up from 98 % Sunday; 100 % Satyrday
[ no EN, unk reason for power drop. ]

IL_Dresden_3 @ 100 % up from 78 % Sunday; 100 % Satyrday
[ no EN, unk reason for power drop. ]

IL_La_Salle_2 @ 100 % up from 79 % Sunday; 100 % Satyrday
[ no EN, unk reason for power drop. ]

OH_Perry_1 @ 70 % up from 22 % Sunday; 25 % Saturday
[ no EN, unk reason for power drop. ]

IL_Quad_Cities_2 @ 100 % up from 80 % Sunday; 100 % Satyrday
[ no EN, unk reason for power drop. ]



Region 4

AR_Arkansas_2 @ 0 % unch from 0 % since 20190527; 100 % Sunday; 100 % Saturday
 AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP ON GROUND FAULT |
 https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en54091

WA_Columbia_2 @ 0 % [ RPV OPEN ( 21 / 31 ) ] plnd start 20190515 ] started early  

MS_GrandGulf_1 @ 100 % unch from 100 % Sunday; 89 % Saturday
[ no EN, unk reason for power drop. ]

LA_RiverBend_1 @ 0 % since 20190601
 MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL |
 https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en54096
[ Exit RFO ( 42 / 34 ] 2nd restart failed; 1st restart failed; missed planned restart date

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[ There is/are currently 02 unit(s) with the RPV OPEN - ref the 2019 Spring Refueling Outage Schedule and Status ]

posted by Staup Knewkinus a Dane Gerous production. All human rights reserved.
 
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