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NPS_Watch May 14, 2018
#1
The Daily Dose - Exposing the nuclear power industry while the nuclear power industry exposes you.


There are 6 EN(s) today, 4 associated with power stations.

[ 2 of the ENs are repeats of Fridays posting. ]

NRC Event Notices for May 14, 2018         
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...514en.html

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------- Power Reactor Event Notices
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------- [ Current event for MS_GrandGulf_1 ]

20180511 | MS_GrandGulf_1 | INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53399
RFOD_035; RX Mode: Refueling; Refueling

"On 5/11/2018, at 2327 hours CDT, with the plant in Mode 5, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station was making
preparations for surveillance test 06-OP-1P75-R-0003, Standby Diesel Generator 1 Functional Test.

The Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced an auto-start of the Division 1 [Emergency] Diesel Generator [EDG]
when the 15AA Bus Potential Transformer (PT) fuse drawer was racked out instead of the line PT fuse drawer for Bus 15AA feeder breaker 152-1514.

[ human error - wrong fuse drawer disabled during testing. ]

This resulted in the 15AA Incoming Feeder Breaker 152-1511 from Engineered Safety Features Transformer 12 opening,
de-energizing the 15AA Bus. The Division 1 EDG started and energized Bus 15AA.

The Division 1 LSS SYSTEM FAIL annunciator was received and Standby Service Water A failed to start
due to the 15AA Bus PT fuse drawer being racked out.

Standby Gas Treatment Train B was manually initiated per the Loss Of AC Power Off Normal Emergency Procedure.
Station equipment operated as expected based on the PT fuse drawer that was racked out.

"The Division 1 EDG was manually tripped from the Control Room because cooling from the Standby Service Water A was not available.

"RHR [residual heat removal] B was in Shutdown Cooling [mode] and was verified not affected"

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

----------- [ 2018 event history for MS_GrandGulf ]

20180501 | MS_GrandGulf_1 | PLANT RECEIVED DIVISION ONE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL LEVEL 1 SIGNAL |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53374
RFOD_025; RX Mode: Refueling

20180415 | MS_GrandGulf_1 | Retract TWO CRACKS IDENTIFIED AT THE FEED WATER LINE 'B' CONTAINMENT CONCRETE PENETRATION |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53335

20180413 | MS_GrandGulf_1 | TWO CRACKS IDENTIFIED AT THE FEED WATER LINE 'B' CONTAINMENT CONCRETE PENETRATION |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53335
RFOD_007; RX Mode: Refueling

20180407 | MS_GrandGulf_1 | Begin RFO

20180405 | MS_GrandGulf_1 | SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HATCH LEFT OPEN |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53317

20180331 | MS_GrandGulf_1 | SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILED SURVEILLANCE TEST |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53304

20180218 | MS_GrandGulf_1 | EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53227

20180210 | MS_GrandGulf_1 | BOTH INNER AND OUTER CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK DOORS INOPERABLE AT THE SAME TIME |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53201

20180130 | MS_GrandGulf_1 | MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO MAIN TURBINE LOAD OSCILLATIONS |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53188

20180116 | MS_GrandGulf_1 | retract MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DURING STARTUP |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53090



----------- [ Current event for TN_WattsBar_2 }

20180511 | TN_WattsBar_2 | CONTAINMENT SHIELD BUILDING INOPERABLE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53398

"At 1011 EDT on May 11, 2018, Containment Shield Building Annulus differential pressure exceeded the required limit.

The Shield Building was declared inoperable requiring entry into Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.15 Conditions A and B.

The event was initiated by failure of the operating annulus vacuum fan.

Main Control Room Operators manually started the stand-by annulus vacuum fan to recover pressure.

Shield Building Annulus differential pressure was restored to the required value at 1016 EDT and TS 3.6.15 Condition A and B were exited on May 11, 2018 at 1016 EDT.

"The failure mechanism for the annulus vacuum fan is being investigated.

"The Containment Shield Building

ensures the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates

[ always spewing ]

assumed in the accident analysis during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).

The Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) would have automatically started and performed its design function

to maintain the Shield Building Annulus differential pressure within required limits.

"The event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)© and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

The NRC Resident has been notified."

[ This event occured on the last day of a three day power drop ( 58 % ), no EN was filed and there's currently no info on why the power was lowered. ]




----------- [ 2018 event history for TN_WattsBar }

20180510 | TN_WattsBar_1 | Retract BOTH TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL INOPERABLE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53355

20180504 | TN_WattsBar_2 | Retract BOTH TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL INOPERABLE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53356

20180422 | TN_WattsBar_2 | BOTH TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL INOPERABLE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53356

20180421 | TN_WattsBar_1 | BOTH TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL INOPERABLE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53355

20180419 | TN_WattsBar_1;2 | UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO EMERGENCY CORE COOLING GAS ACCUMULATION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53349

20180412 | TN_WattsBar_2 | AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53327

20180329 | TN_WattsBar_1 | Retract FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATION THERMAL RELIEF CHECK VALVES TO MEET SURVEILLANCE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53196

20180326_1839_EDT | TN_WattsBar_1 | TEMPORARY LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE BOUNDARY |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53291

20180326_1058_EDT | TN_WattsBar_1 | TEMPORARY LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE BOUNDARY |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53288

20180204 | TN_WattsBar_1 | FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATION THERMAL RELIEF CHECK VALVES TO MEET SURVEILLANCE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53196

20180117 | TN_WattsBar_1 | SHIELD BUILDING INOPERABLE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53173



----------- [ repeat Current event for SC_Oconee_3 ]

20180510_1617_EDT | SC_Oconee_3 | NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53396
RFOD_020; RX Mode: Refueling; Refueling

"Unit 3 experienced a loss of AC power while in Mode 6.

Power was regained automatically from Keowee via the underground path.

[ Lake Keowee is the resevoir used for cooling the Oconee units, to create the lake they built a dam with hydroelectric generating ability. ]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lake_Keowee
The Keowee Hydro Station generates 158 megawatts from the lake's outflows.

"Decay heat removal has been restored. Spent fuel cooling has been restored.

"Emergency procedures [are] in progress."

The Licensee notified the senior NRC resident inspector, State of South Carolina and local authorities.

The total loss of 4160 volt AC power was for approximately 30 seconds.

The unit is refueled and reactor reassembly complete up to bolting on the reactor head.

There was no effect on Units 1 and 2.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, FEMA NWC, DHS NICC, and NuclearSSA


* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT HAWKESWORTH TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0554 EDT ON 5/11/18 * * *

At 0530 EDT, Oconee terminated the notification of unusual event on Unit 3.

The basis for termination was that offsite power was restored and the plant is now in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.

The licensee has notified Oconee and Pickens counties and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email) and NuclearSSA (email).


----------- [ 2018 event history for SC_Oconee ]


20180421 | SC_Oconee_3 | Begin RFO

20180413 | SC_Oconee_1 | MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWING MAIN FEEDWATER CONTROL PROBLEM |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53329



----------- [ repeat Current event for NY_NineMilePoint_2 ]

20180510 | NY_NineMilePoint_2 | VALID EMERGENCY DIESEL START ON PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53395
RFOD_025; RX Mode: Cold Shutdown; Cold Shutdown

"At 0248 [EDT], with the plant shutdown in Mode 4, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced a partial loss of off-site power
during relay testing that resulted in an automatic start of the Division 2 Emergency Diesel Generator.

All systems responded as expected for the event.

The cause is being investigated.

The station responded in accordance with appropriate Special Operating Procedures and restored impacted systems.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)"

At the time of the report, the emergency diesel generators are loaded and supplying plant safety equipment.

The licensee has notified the state of New York Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector.


----------- [ 2018 event history for NY_NineMilePoint ]

20180416 | NY_NineMilePoint_2 | Begin RFO

20180321 | NY_NineMilePoint_1;2 | Retract PART 21 - DEFECTIVE SAFETY RELATED VALVES |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en52857

20180201 | NY_NineMilePoint_2 | UNUSUAL EVENT - FIRE IN THE TURBINE BUILDING LASTING GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53190

20180131 | NY_NineMilePoint_1;2 | Update PART 21 - DEFECTIVE SAFETY RELATED VALVES |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en52857


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------- Other reactor info from daily power tracking
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Region 1

PA_BeaverValley_1 @ 100 % RFO Completed ( used 25 of typ 30 )

NJ_HopeCreek_1 @ 66 % up from 35 % 20 ; 6 % ; 3 % RFO restart ( used 27 of typ 22 )

NY_NineMilePoint_2 @ 4 % RFO restart ( used 27 of typ 22 )

PA_susquehanna_1 @ 96 % ; was dropped to 66 % on Saturday.  RFO Completed ( used 32 of typical 35 )

PA_Susquehanna_2 @ 100 % up from 85 %, no EN, reason for power drop unk.


Region 2

AL_Browns_Ferry_2 @ 60 % down from 92 % ; 41 % ; 23 % ; 0 %. 4 days SD, no EN, reason for SD unk. day 3

AL_Browns_Ferry_3 @ 87 %  since APR 13 ( used 45 of typ 43 days )
[ This unit has not been able to achieve full power since exiting RFO Apr 03 ]

SC_Catawba_2 @ 100 % up from 65 %, no EN, reason for power drop unk, exited RFO Apr 14.

AL_Farley_1 @ 2 % ; 1 % ; 18 % ; 13 %  RFO restart ( used 32 of typ 22 )
[ may have briefly shutdown Saturday. Restart problems. ]

NC_Harris_1 @ 100 % up from 95 % ; 55 % ; 30 % ; 2 % RFO restart ( used 33 of typ 25 )

GA_HAtch_2 @ 100 % up from 95 % ; 50 % , no EN, reason for power drop unk.

TN_WattsBar_2 @ 100 % ; 58 % ; 58 % ; 58 % , no EN, reason for power drop unk.


Region 3

IL_Braidwood_1 @ 100 % Sat. up from 92 %, no EN, reason for power drop unk.

IL_Byron_1 @ 100 % Sat. up from 88 %, no EN, reason for power drop unk.

MI_Cook_2 @ 77 % up from 49 % ; 45 % ; 12 %, recovering from SD during RFO restart ( used 59 of typ 90 )

MI_Fermi_2 @ 87 % ; 87 % ; 87 %  90 % ; 88 % ; 42 % ; 0 % restart from 22 days down
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM AND EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM INJECTION |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53336

IL_QuadCities_1 @ 100 % Sat. up from 87 %, no EN, reason for power drop unk.
IL_QuadCities_2 @ 100 % Sat. up from 98 %, no EN, reason for power drop unk.


Region 4

AR_Arkansas_1 @ 0% down from 100 % up from 0% RFO ( used 44 of typ 35 )
[ no EN. Sudden full power then SD ]

LA_Riverbend_! @ 100 % up from 63 % , dropped to 63 % Sat., n EN, reson for power drop unk.

[ There are currently 1 units with the RPV open - ref the Current ReFueling Outage Schedule and Status ]


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