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NPS_Watch Apr 23, 2018
#1
The Daily Dose - Exposing the nuclear power industry while the nuclear power industry exposes you.


There are 13 EN(s) today, 7 associated with power stations.

NRC Event Notices for April 23, 2018         
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...423en.html

-------------- Power Reactor Event Notices
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


----------- [ Current event for TN_WattsBar_2 @ 100 RX Mode: Power Op ]

20180422 | TN_WattsBar_2 | BOTH TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL INOPERABLE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53356

"On April 22, 2018 at 0222 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 entered TS [Technical Specifications] LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation] 3.0.3 due to both trains of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) becoming inoperable.
During surveillance testing, the gas void values on Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping common to both trains did not meet acceptance criteria.
This caused both RHRS trains to become inoperable.
Operations subsequently vented the RHRS to meet the acceptance criteria and exited TS LCO 3.0.3 at 0227 EDT.
More frequent surveillances will be conducted to monitor gas void volumes while additional analysis is being performed to determine corrective actions."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.



----------- [ Current event for TN_WattsBar_1 @ 100 RX Mode: Power Op ]

20180421 | TN_WattsBar_1 | BOTH TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL INOPERABLE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53355

"On April 21, 2018 at 2152 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 entered TS [Technical Specifications] LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation] 3.0.3 due to both trains of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) becoming inoperable.
During surveillance testing, the gas void values on Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping common to both trains did not meet acceptance criteria.
This caused both RHRS trains to become inoperable.
Operations subsequently vented the RHRS to meet the acceptance criteria and exited TS LCO 3.0.3 at 2222 EDT.
More frequent surveillances will be conducted to monitor gas void volumes while additional analysis is being performed to determine corrective actions."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.


----------- [ 2018 event history TN_WattsBar

20180419 | TN_WattsBar_1;2 | UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO EMERGENCY CORE COOLING GAS ACCUMULATION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53349

20180329 | TN_WattsBar_1 | Retract FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATION THERMAL RELIEF CHECK VALVES TO MEET SURVEILLANCE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53196

20180326_1839_EDT | TN_WattsBar_1 | TEMPORARY LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE BOUNDARY |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53291

20180326_1058_EDT | TN_WattsBar_1 | TEMPORARY LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE BOUNDARY |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53288

20180204 | TN_WattsBar_1 | FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT PENETRATION THERMAL RELIEF CHECK VALVES TO MEET SURVEILLANCE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53196

20180117 | TN_WattsBar_1 | SHIELD BUILDING INOPERABLE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53173


-----------

----------- [ Current event for IL_Braidwood_1 @ 0 % RX Mode: Cold Shutdown ]

[ On 04/22 the RX Mode was Cold Shutdown (RPV head closed) ReFueling Outage Day number 014 ( RFOD_014 ). ]

20180422 | IL_Braidwood_1 | UNDERVOLTAGE ACTUATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE BUS |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53358

"On Sunday, April 22, 2018 at 1646 CDT, a valid actuation of Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Bus 141 Undervoltage (UV) Relay occurred.
At the time, Braidwood Station Unit 1 was performing a pre-planned 1A Diesel Generator (DG) Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Actuation Surveillance,
initiating the 1A DG to emergency start and sequence loads on a safety injection signal.
Following the 1A DG solely supplying electrical power to Bus 141, the 1A DG lost voltage, resulting in an unplanned UV actuation of ESF Bus 141.

The 1A DG output breaker was manually opened and local emergency stop of the 1A DG was attempted.
The 1A DG continued to run at idle.
Fuel supply was secured to the 1A DG and the engine stopped.
[ So they tied to shut it off but had to resort to fuel starvation. ]

Subsequently, operators restored power to ESF Bus 141 from the Unit 1 Offsite Power Source.
Shutdown cooling was maintained throughout the event as the 1B Residual Heat Removal train was unaffected by the actuation.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed...', specifically 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8) for the 'Emergency ac electrical power systems, including: emergency diesel generators (EDGs)...'.

"The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector."

[ On 04/20 the RX Mode was Refueling ( RPV head open ) ReFueling Outage Day number 012 ( RFOD_012 ).

20180420_1730_CDT | IL_Braidwood_1 | DEGRADED REACTOR VESSEL HEAD |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53354

"On Friday, April 20, 2018 at 1730 CDT, during the Braidwood Station Unit 1 refueling outage (A1R20),
a scheduled ultrasonic test (UT) was performed on the top head to upper center disc weld of the Unit 1 reactor head.

The UT identified 19 indications, 9 of which are not acceptable per ASME Section XI, 2001 Edition, 2003 Addenda, Paragraph IWB-3510.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for 'Any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded'.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."


20180420_1042_CDT | IL_Braidwood_1 | BOTH DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53353

On Friday, April 20, 2018 at 1042 CDT, Braidwood Station Unit 1 was at 0 percent power in Mode 6.
The 1A Diesel Generator (DG) was inoperable with troubleshooting in progress.
The 1B DG was being run for a normal monthly run in accordance with 1 BwOSR 3.8.1.2-2, 'Unit One 1B Diesel Generator Operability Surveillance,' and subsequently tripped.
The trip was due to a failure of the overspeed butterfly valve actuator and springs, and not an actual overspeed condition.
The unit entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.2, 'AC Sources - Shutdown,' Condition B for required DG inoperable.
All required TS actions were met at the time of the 1B DG inoperability.
The offsite power source remains available.
At no time was residual heat removal lost.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

[ These ENs show how we can use the RX Mode definitions and the RFO day number to map the state of the RPV as I mentioned in the post The RFO Spike - General Info. ]
[ The typical RFO length for this unit is 18 days. From tracking numerous RFOs the typical closing of the RPV happens 5 days prior to restart. ]
[ These ENs show that on RFOD_012 the RPV was open and on RFOd_014 the RPV was closed, so it would appear the RPV head was sealed on RFOD_13, 5 days before the scheduled restart. ]
[ These ENs also show that even though they are having problems with the EDGs and the RPV head has 9 defects they are continuing toward restart. ]

----------- [ 2018 event history for IL_Braidwood ]


20180419 | IL_Braidwood_1 | UNDERVOLTAGE ACTUATION OF THE ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE BUS |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53347

20180409 | IL_Braidwood_1 | Begin RFO

20180126 | IL_Braidwood_1;2 | Update LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY DUE TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER PLANNED MAINTENANCE  |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53180

20180123 | IL_Braidwood_1;2 | LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY DUE TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER PLANNED MAINTENANCE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53180

20180123 | IL_Braidwood_1;2 | LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY DUE TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER PLANNED MAINTENANCE |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53180


-----------

----------- [ Current event for PA_Susquehanna_1;2 @ 0;100 % RX Mode: Refueling; Power Op ]

20180420 | PA_Susquehanna_1;2 | FITNESS FOR DUTY POLICY VIOLATION |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53352

A non-licensed supervisory contract worker was found in violation of the Fitness for Duty Program. The individual's access to the plant has been terminated.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

----------- [ 2018 event history for PA_Susquehanna
-----------

20180403 | PA_Susquehanna_1;2 | LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT FOLLOWING SURVEILLANCE TESTING |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53310

20180331 | PA_Susquehanna_1 | begin RFO

20180321 | PA_Susquehanna_1;2 | Retract PART 21 - DEFECTIVE SAFETY RELATED VALVES |     
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en52857

20180312 | PA_Susquehanna_1;2 | FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53256

20180211 | PA_Susquehanna_1;2 | SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE OUT OF SPECIFICATION |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53202

20180131 | PA_Susquehanna_1;2 | PART 21 - DEFECTIVE SAFETY RELATED VALVES |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en52857

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------- Other reactor info from daily power tracking

Region 1

NY_IndianPoint_2 @ 56 %  restart ( used 31 of typ 31 )

PA_Limerick_1 @ 100 % Completed RFO ( used 21 of typ 26 )

MA_Pilgrim_1 @ 95 % down from 98 % [ 396 days to permanent SD ]



Region 2

AL_Browns_Ferry_3 @ 85 % holding ( used 45 of typ 43 days )
[ This unit has not been able to achieve full power since exiting RFO Apr 03 ]

GA_Hatch_2 @ 50 % - no EN, reason for power drop unknown. 6th day.

VA_NorthAnna_1 @ 100 % Completed RFO ( used 34 of typ 29 )

SC_Oconee_3 began RFO 04/21 Saturday

VA_Surry_1 began RFO 04/21 Saturday [ one day earlier than orig schedule ]


Region 3

IL_Clinton_1 was due to begin RFO 4/20, is in coastdown, may have been a sched change.

MI_Fermi_2 @ 0 % 9th day down
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM AND EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM INJECTION |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53336


Region 4


[ There are currently 14 units with the RPV open - ref the Current ReFueling Outage Schedule and Status ]


posted by Staup Knewkinus a Dane Gerous production. All human rights reserved.
 
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