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NPS_Watch Apr 09, 2018
#1
The Daily Dose - Exposing the nuclear power industry while the nuclear power industry exposes you.


There are 6 EN(s) today, 2 associated with power stations.

NRC Event Notices for April 09, 2018         
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...409en.html

-------------- Power Reactor Event Notices
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


----------- [ Current event for NC_Brunswick_1 @ 0 % RX Mode: Hot Shutdown ]

20180407 | AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP AND PCIS ACTUATION DURING STATOR COOLING SYSTEM TESTING |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53319

"On April 7, 2018, at 0836 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during testing of the stator cooling system.

The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally.

No safety-related equipment was inoperable at the time of the event.

Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

"Operations responded using Emergency Operating Procedures and stabilized the plant in Mode 3.

Reactor water level being maintained via normal feedwater system. Decay heat is being removed through the bypass valves.

"Reactor water level reached low level 1 (LL1) as a result of the reactor trip.

The LL1 signal causes a Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations.

The LL1 isolations occurred as designed; the Group 8 valves were closed at the time of the event.

Due to the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation, this event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the PCIS.

"Unit 2 was not affected. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The safety significance of this event is minimal. The automatic reactor trip was not complicated and all safety-related systems operated as designed.

"Investigation of the cause of the Reactor Protection System actuation is in progress."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

[ NC_Brunswick is about 65 km ( 40 mi ) S of Wilmington, NC ( EPA radmon stn ) ]



----------- [ 2018 event history for NC_Brunswick_1 ]

20180403 Unit 1 exit RFO ( 32 / 28 )

20180402 | PART 21 - REFURBISHED PRESSURE REGULATOR MAY RESULT IN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE TO START |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53302

20180303 | Unit 1 begin

----------- [ Current event for NC_Harris_1 @ 0 % RX Mode: Hot Standby ]

20180407 | AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (AFW) |
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle...ml#en53318

"On April 7, 2018 at 0451 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an auto actuation of 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps occurred during the shutdown of Unit 1 for Harris Nuclear Plant's refueling outage.

Plant Operators successfully took control of the AFW flow and noted the 'B' Main Feed pump was still running with proper suction and discharge pressures of 430 lbs. and 1000 lbs.

"The 'A' and 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received.

The cause of the actuation is still being evaluated.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

20180407 begin RFO [ RFOD_001; RX Mode: Hot Standby ]

----------- [ 2018 event history for  ]

[ There are no other ENs for this unit ]

-----------  

[ NC_Harris is about

34.3 km (21.3 mi) SW of NC_Raleigh ( EPA radmon stn )
90.2 km (56 mi ) SE of NC_Greensborough ( EPA radmon stn )
176 km (109 mi) NE of NC_Charlotte ( EPA radmon stn ) ]

-------------

The Most Dangerous U.S. N-Plant? NRC's Dishonest Rating System – A Report by NC WARN
http://www.ncwarn.org/2006/05/one-of-the...ty-record/

May 23, 2006
Shearon Harris’ Failed Safety Record

[ some excerpts ]

The deception began decades ago, when the NRC created the “Unresolved Safety Issues” category. An NRC manager told NRC Commissioners, “It was developed in order to get plants licensed without resolving significant safety questions …”

“The NRC performance review process is not a regulatory scheme, it’s a regulatory scam,” says nuclear safety engineer David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists.

Progress Energy has remained in violation of 10 CFR Part 50 regulations since 1992, when NRC declared a widely used fire barrier called Thermo-Lag to be “inoperable” after its manufacturer was found to have falsified testing data.

Shearon Harris suffered a major fire in 1989, caused by an electrical short, which burned for three hours and required response by 30 firefighters. The fire ran 100 feet down an electrical cable, causing a hydrogen leak and explosion, and damaged transformers and three floors of the turbine building.
“NRC still assessing safety significance of major fire at Shearon-Harris,” Inside NRC, McGraw-Hill, October 23, 1989

[ Much more at the report link, some of these problems may have been corrected since the writing of the report, but it's only been 12 years so some may not have been fixed yet. ]

-------------
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------- Other reactor info from daily power tracking

Region 1

MA_Pilgrim_1 is still shutdown, 34th day. [ 410 days to permanent SD ]



Region 2

AL_Browns_Ferry_3 @ 72 % recovering from shutdown while Restarting, No EN. used 45 of typ 43 days for RFO.


AL_Farley_1 @ 0 % 20180408 begin RFO

TN_Sequoyah_1 @ 0 % 20180407 begin RFO



Region 3

IL_Braidwood_1 @ 0 % 20180409 begin RFO

IL_Quad_Cities_2 @ 78 % restarting ( used 20 of typ 17 )



Region 4

CA_DiabloCanyon_1 @ 94 %, No EN, unk reason for power drop.

MS_GrandGulf_1 @ 0 %, No EN. Sched for RFO 04/18. Unk reason for shutdown.

AZ_PaloVerde_1 @ 0 %, no EN. unk reasn for drop, sched for RFO 04/10, may have SD early.


[ There are currently 7 units with the RPV open - ref the Current ReFueling Outage Schedule and Status ]


posted by Staup Knewkinus a Dane Gerous production. All human rights reserved.
 
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